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Does a judicial decision that vindicates minority rights inevitably give birth to a
special kind of backlash, a more virulent reaction than legislation achieving the same
result would produce? We examine this question with respect to Roe v. Wade-
so often invoked as the paradigmatic case of court-caused backlash-and with the
pending marriage cases in mind. As we have shown, conflict over abortion escalated
before the Supreme Court ever ruled in Roe, driven by movements struggling over
legislative reform and by Republican Party efforts to recruit voters historically
aligned with the Democratic Party. these and other features of the abortion conflict
suggest that the Court's decision in Roe was not the abortion conflict's sole or even
its principal cause.
When change through adjudication or legislation threatens the status quo, it can
prompt countermobilization and backlash. We do not doubt that adjudication
can prompt backlash, but we do doubt that adjudication is distinctively more likely
than legislation to prompt backlash or that the abortion conflict illustrates this
supposed property of adjudication. Advocates concerned about these questions have
to make in-context and on-balance judgments that consider not only the costs but
also the benefits of engagement.
AUTHORS
Linda Greenhouse is the Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
Reva B. Siegel is the Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
60 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 240 (2013)
241
60 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 240 (2013)
Can we really avoid conflict by avoiding courts? Does litigating produce
conflict that legislating would not? Many invoke Roe v. Wade to argue that es-
tablishing minority rights in court-as opposed to waiting for political pressure
to mature into legislation-generates polarization that change through politics
would not. Our research into the history of the abortion conflict leads us to
question the one-dimensional story of court-centered backlash so often attribut-
ed to Roe.
In June 2010, as the Proposition 8 trial was wrapping up in a San Francis-
co courtroom, Federal District Judge Vaughn Walker put this question to Ted
Olson, the plaintiffs' counsel, who was about to make his closing argument on
behalf of the two same-sex couples seeking the right to marry:
[I]sn't the danger.., to the position that you are taking... not
that you're going to lose this case, either here or at the Court of Ap-
peals or at the Supreme Court, but that you might win it?
And, as in other areas where the Supreme Court has ultimately
constitutionalized something that touches upon highly-sensitive so-
cial issues, and taken that issue out of the political realm, that all that
has happened is that the forces, the political forces that otherwise have
been frustrated, have been generated and built up this pressure, and
have, as in a subject matter that I'm sure you're familiar with, plagued
our politics for 30 years, isn't the same danger here with this issue?1
Ted Olson replied: "I think the case that you're referring to has to do with
abortion." "It does, indeed," said the judge.2
Running through commentary on the certiorari grants in Hollingsworth v.
Perry3 and United States v. Windsor4 are continual references to Roe v. Wade.'
'Watch out! Don't go there! Look what happened forty years ago when the Su-
preme Court granted women the right to abortion," warn critics. The Roe-
centered backlash narrative, it seems, is the trump card in many discussions of the
marriage cases. 6 But what do we mean by backlash in the context of a Supreme
1. Transcript of Proceedings at 3095, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(No. C-09-2292-VRW).
2. Id.
3. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. grantedsub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 786 (2012).
4. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Among numerous examples, see Charles Lane, Pushing Same-Sex MarriageAhead, WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 2012, http://artides.wasbingtonpost.com/2012-12-10/opinions/35745714 Ugay-marriage-gay
-rights-lawyers-states-ban, which warned those litigating in favor of same-sex marriage that Roe
"stirred the pro-life movement, subjected the court to withering scholarly attack and forever
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Court decision? What might an accurate account of what occurred before and af-
ter Roe v. Wade actually have to impart? And why should we care, on the fortieth
anniversary of Roe, the tenth anniversary of Lawrence v. Texas,7 and the eve of
Peny and Windsor, about getting this story right?'
The premise of the Roe backlash narrative is that there is something about the
judicial dedaration of minority rights that produces an especially virulent and polar-
izing reaction among losers who would not respond in a similar fashion to legisla-
tive defeat. On this view, court decisions that vindicate minority rights or that pick
winners of vigorously contested daims have the harmful effect of shutting down
ordinary politics and giving birth to a new, deformed politics: "Roe Rage," as one of
us has labeled it.9 Winning, in other words, can be even worse than losing. The
message seems to be that minority daimants should stay away from courts.
But is that the right message? Is the Court's forty-year-old decision in Roe
the primary source of the ongoing conflict around abortion?
With respect to the role that Roe has come to play in the backlash narrative,
we refer readers to the Yale Law Journal article we published in 2011, Before (and
After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash." We have added the article
as a new afterword to the second edition of our 2010 book, Before Roe v. Wade:
Voices That Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court's Ruling. 11
In that work, we ask what conflict over abortion before Roe might teach us
about the logic of conflict after Roe. Examining the period before the Court ruled
allows us to perform something of a natural science experiment to investigate
what forces were capable of generating political conflict over abortion in the ab-
sence of judicial review. We found facts absent in most discussions of Roe and
backlash. Consider these features of the abortion conflict before the Court ruled:
politicized judicial nominations." As we argue below, the first and third of these assertions are open
to serious question. The second has little meaning outside its particular context.
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. Backlash, of course, is not limited to courts. A December 26 front page Nesw York Times artide on
the weakening Tea Party movement, for example, cites a former Republican Party chairman in New
Hampshire for the view that "a backlash against 'tinfoil hat' issues pushed by the Tea Party-
dominated legislature" there led to the loss of the Republican majority in one house and its near loss
in the other. See Trip Gabriel, Sidestepping Fiscal Showdown, Weaker Tea Party Narrows Focus, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26,2012, at Al. This is conventional talk in politics.
9. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
10. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Bgfore (andAfer) Roe v. Wade. Nesw QuestionsAbout Backlash,
120 YALE LJ. 2028 (2011).
11. LINDA GREENHOUSE &REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING (2d ed. 2012), available at
http://documents.law.yale.edu/before-roe.
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(1) Before Roe, there was escalating conflict over abortion,
driven by social movements, by religious institutions, and
by political parties.12
(2) Before Roe, there was broad popular support for liberali-
zation of abortion law. Polling on the eve of the deci-
sion showed that a substantial majority of Americans
favored decriminalizing abortion: More than two-thirds
of self-identified Republicans-more Republicans than
Democrats-and 56 percent of Catholics told Gallup
that "[t]he decision to have an abortion should be made
solely by a woman and her physician."13 Three major sur-
veys conducted in the immediate aftermath of Roe-Harris,
Field, and NORC-all showed that the decision did not
reduce but rather consolidated these broad levels of popular
support. 14
(3) Before Roe, despite broad popular support, liberalization of
abortion law had all but come to a halt in the face of con-
certed opposition by a Catholic-led minority. It was, in
other words, decidedly not the case that abortion reform
was on an inevitable march forward if only the Supreme
Court had stayed its hand. 5
12. See id. at 81-115,212-20 (documenting pre-Roe conflict and Republican Party intervention).
13. Id. at 207-10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. William Ray Arney &William H. Trescher, Trends in Attitudes TovardAbortion, 1972-1975, FAM.
PLAN. PERSP., May/June 1976, at 117,124 (reviewing post-Roe polling data and observing "that the
1973 NORC [National Opinion Research Center] survey, fielded just two months after the 1973
Supreme Court... decisions, showed a remarkable liberalization of abortion attitudes on the part of
all groups and subgroups of American society," that "[v]ery little change occurred in the years
following the decisions" and firther suggesting that the Court's action may have had "an imme-
diately legitimating effect on public opinion").
15. Perhaps the most striking example of political and interest-group driven backlash in the absence of
any court ruling was the New York Legislature's 1972 repeal of the liberal abortion law it had
enacted two years earlier. The repeal vote, which Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller vetoed, was in
direct response to the campaign by an energized Catholic Church, assisted by President Richard M.
Nixon, campaigning for reelection and seeking the traditionally Democratic Catholic vote. On May
16, 1972, Nixon wrote a letter to New York's Terence Cardinal Cooke endorsing the church's
efforts. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 11, at 157-60. Corinna Barrett Lain observes in a
recent article that an accurate understanding of Roe in its historical context "turns the conventional
understanding of the decision on its head." Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-DownJudicial Review, 101
GEO. LJ. 113,134(2012). She argues that "[r]ather than a Supreme Court thwarting majority will,
Roe shows a Supreme Court vindicating it-again responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in public
opinion when change through the democratic process was blocked." !d at 135.
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(4) Before Roe, Catholic opposition to abortion was amplified
by the Republican Party as it began to employ attacks on
abortion to recruit Catholic voters who historically had vot-
ed with the Democratic Party. Our article draws on evi-
dence from the 1972 presidential election to show how the
Republican Party used the abortion issue in the service of
party realignment in the period before Roe. The article also
shows the expansion of this strategy during the 1980 elec-
tion, in the creation of the coalition of conservative Catho-
lics and evangelical Protestants who helped vote Ronald
Reagan into office.16
As we show, abortion was already entangled in party politics before the
Court ruled. That dynamic did not begin but instead continued in the years after
the decision. The entanglement of abortion in party realignment explains how,
over time, Republicans and Democrats came to switch positions on the abortion
issue-leaders before the base-and assume their current polarized positions on
abortion. This change in the structure of the conflict did not happen in the im-
mediate aftermath of Roe but instead took nearly twenty years to accomplish.
Our paper argues that when you line up the evidence, political realignment better
explains the timing and shape of political polarization around abortion than does
a court-centered story of backlash."7
Of course, judicial decisions like Roe and Brown"8 provoke conflict. The
question is whether judicial decisions are likely to provoke more virulent forms of
political reaction than legislation that vindicates rights. There was, is, and will
continue to be conflict over abortion, same-sex marriage, and indeed the very
meaning of equality. When minorities seek to unsettle the status quo and vindi-
cate rights-whether in courts, legislatures, or even at the polls-there is likely to
be conflict and, if the claimants prevail, possibly backlash too. To the question of
whether one can avoid conflict over such issues by avoiding courts, the answer
16. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 10, at 2052-67.
17. Political scientists Edward G. Carmines and James Woods argue persuasively in an important artide
that party realignment on abortion-the "issue evolution process"--was largely the work of party
elites and activists-in other words, the result of top-down strategy rather than a bottom-up
response. Edward G. Carmines &James Woods, The Role ?fParty Activists in the Evolution f the
Abortion Issue, 24 POL. BEHAV. 361, 363 (2002). They ffirther observe that "it is not until 1992 that
the new alignment of abortion attitudes and partisanship becomes a permanent feature of American
party politics"-hardly evidence of the spontaneous popular uprising that Roe is so often credited
with having induced. Id. at 371-72; see also Daniel K Williams, The GOP'Abortion Strategy: WHy
Pro-choice Republicans Became Pro-lffe in the 1970s, 23J. POL'Y HIST. 513 (2011).
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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from an accurate history of Roe v. Wade is: No. The abortion conflict escalated
before the Supreme Court ruled.
To the further question of whether one should avoid asserting claims of
rights for fear of igniting conflict, the answer must be: It depends. Bringing
about change is hard work, including the hard work of deciding when, costs and
benefits considered, litigation and/or legislation are worth pursuing in the first
place. Even litigation losses have produced gains for marriage equality, as
Douglas NeJaime and others have shown us."9 In each case, a contextual judg-
ment should drive the decision whether to make rights daims in court-not the
assumption that progressives will surely get punished if they go to court seeking
rights out of turn.
19. Douglas NeJaime, Winning ThroughLosing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011).
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